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A First Amendment Right of Access to a
Juror's Identity: Toward a Fuller
Understanding of the Jury's
Deliberative Process
Robert Lloyd Raskopf*
[I]t would be difficult to single out any aspect of government of higher con-
cern and importance to the people than the manner in which criminal trials
are conducted ....
Chief Justice Burgert
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its inception in England in the era before the Norman con-
quest, the jury has played a central role in justice, politics, and gov-
ernment.' The jury's historical role as the safeguard against the
wrath of the ruthless prosecutor and the tyranny of the corrupt judge
is legendary and need not be chronicled here.2
Despite its undoubted importance, surprisingly little is known
about the jury's deliberative process. The few jury studies conducted
to date have enhanced public understanding of the fact-finding and
* Partner, Townley & Updike, New York, New York; J.D., 1976, B.S., 1973, Bos-
ton College; member, NYCBA Committee on Communications Law and ABA Forum
Committee on Communications Law. The author wishes to express his appreciation
for the invaluable contributions to this article made by his associate, Paul Grobman.
Harry T. Walters, an associate, and Nicholas Aker, a summer associate, also partici-
pated in the preparation of this article.
t Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980) (Burger, C.J.,
plurality).
1. See generally Pope, The Jury, 39 TEx. L. REV. 426 (1961).
2. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968); Pope, supra note 1, at 443
("One of the great but little discussed checks and balances of our governmental system
is [the] separation of functions of judge and jury over law and fact."). But see Note,
The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170, 192 (1964)
(arguing that by the end of the nineteenth century the jury had come to be viewed as
an "outmoded and none-too-reliable institution for resolving disputed questions of
fact").
decision-making processes used by juries.3 Moreover, in recent years,
post-verdict comments by jurors have been utilized by scholars study-
ing the functioning of our judicial system, as well as by journalists
and other members of the media in their reports to the public. The
frequency with which juror comments are reported and analyzed ap-
pears to be increasing. Indeed, one might reasonably hypothesize
that the public anticipates a report of jurors' comments in well-publi-
cized cases.
Although discharged jurors occasionally initiate contact with mem-
bers of the media, discussions usually are initiated by the media.4
However, despite the salutary effect of jurors' comments on under-
standing the jury's deliberative process, the public's right of access to
juror identities has not been uniformly established.
Finding that post-verdict juror interviews have a significant posi-
tive effect on the judicial process, several lower courts have held that
the public has a right of access to the names and addresses of jurors.5
In fact, these courts have instituted safeguards to ensure the protec-
tion of jurors' safety and privacy.6 Other lower courts, however, have
held that no right of access to juror names or addresses exists, and
subsequently have refused to release the identity of jurors.7
Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue, a re-
cent line of cases, beginning with Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia,8 has recognized and gradually expanded the first amendment
right of access to encompass the right to attend and receive informa-
tion about most aspects of a criminal trial.
This article will address whether there is a first amendment right
of access to the names and addresses of jurors. Parts II and III will
3. See LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE CENTER BULLETIN No. 8, at 72 (Fall 1983). '
4. Juror interviews often are possible only if the media has access to a juror's
name and address. Many state and federal courts, after a jury has rendered its verdict
in a case which has attracted significant public notoriety, attempt to shield the just-
discharged jurors from immediate face-to-face interaction by escorting them to a re-
stricted area of the courthouse and providing them with transportation home. See, e.g.,
United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719, 722-23 n.4 (D. Mass. 1987). Moreover, in
cases in which the discharged jurors leave the courtroom through public exits, few
newspapers are able to mobilize the reporters necessary to simultaneously interview
twelve jurors. Finally, in cases which assume importance only after a jury has ren-
dered its verdict, a list of the jurors' names and addresses is the only means by which
to contact the jurors for an interview.
5. In re Baltimore Sun Co., 841 F.2d 74, 75 (4th Cir. 1988); Doherty, 675 F. Supp.
at 725; In re New York Times Co., Misc. No. 82-0124 (D.D.C. June 19, 1982).
6. See, e.g., Doherty, 675 F. Supp. at 725 (release of jurors' names and addresses
seven days after verdict returned to accommodate jurors' legitimate expectation of
privacy).
7. United States v. Edwards, 823 F.2d 111, 117 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 1109 (1988); United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1210 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978); Newsday, Inc. v. Sise, 71 N. Y.2d 146, 153, 518 NE.2d 930, 933,
524 N. Y.S.2d 35, 39 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2823 (1988).
8. 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (Burger, C.J., plurality).
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discuss the series of Supreme Court and lower federal court cases
dealing with the first amendment right of access to judicial proceed-
ings, and will show that the constitutional objective underlying this
right--contrary to the strict construction rendered by certain
courts-requires that it encompass more than a mere right to attend
judicial proceedings. Parts IV, V, and VI will analyze the principles
articulated by the Supreme Court in other cases involving a right of
access and conclude that the interests which led the Supreme Court
to recognize a constitutional right of access to various aspects of a
criminal trial would be similarly advanced by aiding the ability of the
media to contact jurors after the conclusion of their jury service.
II. SUPREME COURT RECOGNITION OF A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT
OF ACCESS TO JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
Until quite recently in American jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court had never directly acknowledged a first amendment right of
access to judicial proceedings. However, the Court had long held that
the sixth amendment provided a criminal defendant with the right to
a public trial.9 Moreover, the Court had intimated on several occa-
sions that an independent first amendment right to a public trial ex-
isted.10 Nevertheless, some doubt remained, especially in light of the
Court's holding in Gannett v. DePasquale,l' that an accused's right to
a public trial under the sixth amendment conferred no rights on the
public or press. It was not until 1980, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia,12 that the Court recognized a first amendment right of
the public and the press to observe criminal proceedings. 13
In Richmond Newspapers, the trial court in a murder prosecution,
upon defendant's request and without objection from the prosecution,
9. The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial .... U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
10. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 (1948) ("[W]e have been unable to find a single
instance of a criminal trial conducted in camera in any federal, state, or municipal
court during the history of this country."); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947)
("A trial is a public event. What transpires in the courtroom is public property.");
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 361 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Of
course trials must be public and the public have a deep interest in trials."); see Rich-
mond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573 & n.9.
11. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
12. 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (Burger, C.J., plurality). The ruling was splintered, but a
majority of the court did acknowledge a first amendment public right of access to
criminal trials.
13. Id. at 580 (Burger, C.J., plurality), 584-85 (Brennan, J., concurring) (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
closed the trial to the public. 14 The court denied a motion by news
reporters to vacate the order, stating that the presence of people in
the courtroom was "distracting to the jury."15 After the Virginia
Supreme Court denied review, the United States Supreme Court
reversed.16
The Court's plurality opinion initially traced the history of the
open criminal trial in England and in the American colonies and
noted that "the very nature of a criminal trial was its openness to
those who wished to attend."17 The plurality recited several advan-
tages to holding open trials. First, openness assures that the proceed-
ings are conducted fairly to all concerned, since a "nexus [exists]
between openness, fairness, and the perception of fairness."1s Sec-
ond, the public nature of trials has a "significant community thera-
peutic value" since allowing the public to see justice in action
reassures the public that society is secure, thereby reducing the
chance that public outrage at a crime will result in the anarchy of
lynch mobs.19 The plurality further noted that "[tihe crucial prophy-
lactic aspects of the administration of justice cannot function in the
dark; no community catharsis can occur if justice is 'done in a corner
[or] in any covert manner.'"20 Finally, the openness of criminal tri-
als educates the public about the criminal justice system, thus in-
creasing respect for the law.21 The plurality conceded that the
media's special role in communicating information about criminal
proceedings to the public "validates the media claim of functioning as
surrogates for the public."22
In light of the long history of open criminal trials, the plurality
held that there is a presumption of openness which attaches to such
trials.23 The plurality then turned to the specific guarantees of the
14. Id. at 559-60 (Burger, C.J. , plurality). The trial was the defendant's fourth
trial; the first trial resulted in a conviction which was overturned on appeal, and the
second and third trials resulted in mistrials. One of the mistrials may have resulted
from a juror's reading press reports about the previous trials. Id. at 559 (Burger, C.J.,
plurality).
15. Id. at 561 (Burger, C.J., plurality) (quoting Transcript of Sept. 11, 1978, Hear-
ing on Motion to Vacate at 19, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555
(1980)).
16. Id. at 562, 581 (Burger, C.J., plurality).
17. Id. at 568 (Burger, C.J., plurality); see id. at 564-69 (Burger, C.J., plurality).
18. Id. at 569-70 (Burger, C.J., plurality).
19. Id. at 570-71 (Burger, C.J., plurality).
20. Id. at 571 (Burger, C.J., plurality) (quoting the 1677 Concessions and Agree-
ments of West New Jersey, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 188 (R. Perry ed.
1959)).
21. Id. at 572 (Burger, C.J., plurality) (citing 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1834, at
438 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976)).
22. Id. at 572-73 (Burger, C.J., plurality).
23. Id. at 573 (Burger, C.J., plurality).
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first amendment, 24 as made applicable to the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment,25 and noted that the
guaranteed rights "share a common core purpose of assuring freedom
of communication on matters relating to the functioning of govern-
ment."26 Citing Branzburg v. Hayes,27 the plurality held that the ex-
plicit first amendment rights to speak, to publish, and to assemble
would have little meaning if access to criminal trials could be arbi-
trarily foreclosed. 28
Having recognized and confirmed the first amendment right, the
plurality proceeded to balance this right against the accused's sixth
amendment rights.29 To account for both of these competing inter-
ests, the plurality held that a trial court must consider any less re-
strictive means to ensure the fairness of a trial before it may order
closure of the trial; moreover, if the court does order closure, it must
articulate its reasons in findings.30 Since the trial court had failed to
even acknowledge the existence of the first amendment right, the
plurality, joined by concurring justices, reversed the closure order.31
Two years after Richmond Newspapers, a majority of the Supreme
Court reconfirmed and expanded upon the first amendment right of
access in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court.32 In Globe Newspa-
per, the Court assessed the constitutionality of a Massachusetts stat-
ute requiring closed trials in prosecutions involving sexual offenses
24. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
25. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
26. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575.
27. 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (holding that first amendment does not give a reporter
the privilege not to answer grand jury questions about a criminal case under
investigation).
28. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576-77, 580 (Burger, C.J., plurality).
29. Id. at 580-81 (Burger, C.J., plurality). The plurality noted the Court previously
had held that although the sixth amendment guarantees a public trial to the accused,
it does not guarantee the accused a private trial. Id. at 580 (Burger, C.J., plurality); see
Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 382 (1979).
30. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580-81 (Burger, C.J., plurality).
31. Id. at 581 (Burger, C.J., plurality). Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion
joined by Justice Marshall, adopted a two-part test substantially similar to the test set
out in the plurality opinion. Id. at 597-98 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Stewart,
while finding a first amendment right of access, emphasized that the right is not abso-
lute and may be overridden in certain situations. Id. at 600 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Justice Blackmun restated his belief that the sixth amendment should be the constitu-
tional source of the public right of access. Id. at 603 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Jus-
tices White and Stevens, who joined with Chief Justice Burger in the plurality opinion,
also filed brief separate concurring opinions.
32. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
against minors.3 3 The Court struck down the statute as violative of
the first and fourteenth amendments.34 Utilizing the test laid out by
the Richmond Newspapers plurality, the Court held that "[w]here, as
in the present case, the State attempts to deny the right of access in
order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, it must be
shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental
interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."35 The Court
recognized that protecting minor victims of sex crimes was a compel-
ling interest.36 Nevertheless, the Court held that the mandatory clo-
sure rule was unjustified because it was not the least restrictive
means of achieving that goal.37 The constitutionally required
method, according to the Court, is to allow the trial court to deter-
mine the necessity of closure on a case-by-case basis38 after consider-
ing a host of factors. 39
Having firmly established a first amendment right of access to the
criminal trial itself, the Supreme Court in 1984 interpreted this right
to apply to the jury selection process as well. In Press-Enterprise Co.
v, Superior Court of California40 (Press-Enterprise I), the trial court
closed most of the voir dire proceedings at the commencement of a
criminal trial, a process which lasted six weeks under California
law.41 After the voir dire proceedings, and again after the trial itself,
the court refused to release a transcript of the voir dire sessions.42
In reviewing the case, the Supreme Court first explored the devel-
opment of the jury from its inception in the era before the Norman
conquest. The Court concluded that throughout the history of trial
by jury, the jury selection process had been presumptively open to
33. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16A (West 1981); see Globe Newspaper, 457
U.S. at 598 n.1.
34. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 610-11.
35. Id. at 606-07.
36. Id. at 607.
37. Id. at 607-08.
38. Citing the Richmond Newspapers plurality opinion, the Court suggested that
individualized determinations are always necessary before the right of access may be
denied. Id. at 608 n.20; see Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581
(1980) (Burger, C.J., plurality). The Globe Newspaper dissent, in contrast, averred that
mandatory rules were workable but that discretionary rules were not:
Certainly if the law were discretionary, most judges would exercise that dis-
cretion soundly and would avoid unnecessary harm to the child, but victims
and their families are entitled to assurance of such protection. The legislature
did not act irrationally in deciding not to leave the closure determination to
the idiosyncrasies of individual judges subject to the pressures available to the
media.
Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 618-19 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
39. Among the factors the Court suggested for consideration are the age and ma-
turity of the minor victim, the nature of the crime, the victim's wishes on the subject
of closure, and the interests of parents and relatives. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 608.
40. 464 U.S. 501 (1984) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise I].
41. See id. at 503.
42. Id. at 504.
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the public with only rare exceptions. 43 After noting the virtues of
openness, the Court stated that "[c]losed proceedings, although not
absolutely precluded, must be rare and only for cause shown that
outweighs the value of openness." 44 To overcome the presumption of
openness, the trial court must articulate specific "findings that clo-
sure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to
serve [those values]."45 When limited closure is necessary, the first
amendment may still require that the court release a transcript of
the closed proceedings within a reasonable time, with portions re-
dacted, if necessary, to protect the prospective juror from embarrass-
ment.46 Without explanation and without consideration of less
restrictive means, the Supreme Court held that it was improper for a
trial court to close voir dire proceedings to the public.47
In its most recent first amendment right of access decision, the
Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Califor-
nia48 (Press-Enterprise II) held the first amendment right of access
applicable to preliminary hearings as well as to criminal trials.49 The
Court first examined the historical evidence and determined that
preliminary hearings traditionally were accessible to the public. 50
The Court then assessed the merits of public access to the prelimi-
nary hearing and concluded that, as the preliminary hearing is simi-
lar to a trial, the same considerations which led the Court to find a
constitutional right of access to the criminal trial were equally appar-
ent in the context of preliminary hearings.51 The Court, therefore,
recognized a right of access to preliminary hearings, and held that
the hearings could not be closed unless closure was "'essential to
43. Id. at 505-08.
44. Id. at 509 (footnote omitted).
45. Id. at 510. For example, in a rape trial, as in Press-Enterprise I, prospective
jurors may be questioned during voir dire about very sensitive matters. Id. at 512. The
Supreme Court recognized that jurors may have protectable privacy interests regard-
ing such questioning. However, to minimize the risk of unnecessary closure, the Court
stated that the burden must be on the prospective juror to approach the trial judge
about a sensitive matter once the judge warns the prospective jurors about the scope of
possible questioning. Id.
46. Id. The Court suggested that it may even be permissible to withhold the name
of the juror. Id at 512-13.
47. Id. at 511.
48. 478 U.S. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise II].
49. Id. at 10.
50. Id. at 10-11.
51. Id. at 11-13. The Court placed special emphasis on the fact that the prelimi-
nary hearing is often the final step in the criminal proceeding, and thus "provides the
sole occasion for public observation of the criminal system." Id at 12.
preserve higher values ... ' "52 Finally, even when closure is justi-
fied, it must be narrowly tailored to serve only those higher values.53
III. LOWER COURT EXPANSION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF
ACCESS TO OTHER FACETS OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
A. Generally
Thus far, the Supreme Court's right of access decisions have been
largely limited to the question of access to actual criminal judicial
proceedings. Although some lower courts have adopted a bright line
rule, refusing to extend the right of access beyond actual proceedings
or transcripts of proceedings,54 most lower courts have recognized
that the objective underlying the Supreme Court's recognition of the
right of access is served equally by a right of access to other facets of
the criminal process. 55
Indeed, as the Supreme Court itself has recognized, the first
amendment does not expressly speak of a right of access to criminal
trials.56 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recognized a right of
access to criminal trials and other criminal proceedings by concluding
that access to these processes advances a fundamental core purpose
of the first amendment by promoting an informed discussion of gov-
ernmental affairs. 57
Lower federal and state courts, consistent with the constitutional
objective underlying the Supreme Court's decisions recognizing a
right of access to various criminal processes, have determined that
the first amendment right of access necessarily encompasses the right
to acquire the information necessary to ensure an informed public
discussion of the criminal process. Consequently, courts have recog-
nized a first amendment right of access to virtually every judicial
proceeding in the criminal process.5 8 Moreover, numerous courts
52. Id. at 13-14 (quoting Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)).
53. Id. at 14 (citing Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510).
54. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 747 F.2d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 1984) (first
amendment right of access limited to physical presence at trials); Newsday, Inc. v. Sise,
71 N.Y.2d 146, 153 n.4, 518 N.E.2d 930, 933 n.4, 524 N.Y.S.2d 35, 39 n.4 (1987) (no consti-
tutional right of access to jurors' names and addresses where petitioner has not alleged
denial of access to a judicial proceeding or transcript of a proceeding), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 2823 (1988).
55. See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 10 n.3.
56. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603-04 (1982).
57. Id. at 604-05 (first amendment right of access to the criminal process exists to
"ensure that [the] constitutionally protected 'free discussion of governmental affairs' is
an informed one") (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); Press-Enterprise
I, 464 U.S. at 516 (Stevens, J., concurring) (distinction between trials and other official
proceedings is not important in evaluating first amendment issues).
58. See, e.g., In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 389 (4th Cir. 1986) (plea and
sentencing hearings); In re Iowa Freedom of Information Council, 724 F.2d 658, 661
(8th Cir. 1983) (contempt hearings); United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 364 (5th Cir.
[Vol. 17: 357, 1990] Right of Access to Juror's Identity
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
have found a right of access to materials and information, apart from
judicial proceedings, which fundamentally relate to the criminal
process. 5
9
B. Access to Jurors' Names and Addresses
Several lower courts have specifically addressed whether a consti-
tutional or common law right of access to jurors' names and ad-
dresses exists. In In re Baltimore Sun Co.,60 the Fourth Circuit
recognized a right of access to the names and addresses of jurors in a
venire.61 The court's holding was based on the common law right of
access to information contained in the public record; the court de-
clined to address the first amendment issue.62 Nevertheless, the
court acknowledged that it had drawn upon the principles set forth
in Press-Enterprise I and Press-Enterprise 1,63 and conducted the
two-step first amendment analysis prescribed by the Supreme Court.
First, the Fourth Circuit examined the historical evidence of access,
finding that "[w]hen the jury system grew up . . . everybody knew
everybody on the jury," and that this remained the case in many ru-
1983) (bail hearings); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 557 (3d Cir. 1982) (pretrial
suppression hearings); In re Romeo, No. 87-0808RC (D. Mass. May 1, 1987) (LEXIS,
Genfed Library, Dist file) (extradition hearings). Courts also have recognized a right
of access to various aspects of civil proceedings. See Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733
F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984) (civil trials).
59. See, e.g., In re Search Warrant, 855 F.2d 569, 573 (8th Cir. 1988) (right of access
to affidavits and other materials supporting applications for search warrants served
during pre-indictment phase of investigation), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 793 (1989); Seat-
tle Times v. United States Dist. Court, 845 F.2d 1513, 1517 (9th Cir. 1988) (right of ac-
cess to documents filed in connection with pretrial release proceedings); In re New
York Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 111-13 (2d Cir. 1987) (motion to suppress wiretap evi-
dence filed under seal), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 1272 (1988); In re National Broadcasting
Co., 828 F.2d 340, 345 (6th Cir. 1987) (access to documents filed in connection with pro-
ceedings relating to disqualification of judge); In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383,
388-89 (4th Cir. 1986) (access to affidavits relating to sentencing hearing); Associated
Press v. United States Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1983) (access to pretrial
documents in criminal case in general); United States v. Martin, 684 F. Supp. 341, 343-
44 (D. Mass. 1988) (right of access to portion of agent's affidavit supporting application
for wiretap); United States v. Eaves, 685 F. Supp. 1243, 1245 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (right of
access to video and audio tapes admitted into evidence).
60. 841 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1988).
61. Id. at 75.
62. See id. at 75-76 n.4. Information other than names and addresses contained in
questionnaires were statutorily exempted from disclosure under 28 U.S.C. § 1867(f)
(1982); see Baltimore Sun, 841 F.2d at 75.
63. Baltimore Sun, 841 F.2d at 76. The court went so far as to state that the con-
trary holding in United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 968 (1978), would be different had it followed Pre.s-Enterprise I and II see infra
note 81.
ral communities throughout the country.64 Addressing the need for
disclosure of the jurors' identities, the court determined that the pub-
lic would lose confidence in the judicial process if cases were allowed
to be tried by anonymous juries.6 5
At least two federal district courts have found a first amendment
right of access to jurors' names and addresses. In United States v.
Doherty,66 the United States District Court of Massachusetts applied
a first amendment analysis and found that, while the history of post-
verdict access to jurors was scant, such access played a "positive role
in the actual functioning of the judicial process."6 7 Moreover, the Do-
herty court noted:
It is important for the public to receive information about the operation of the
administration of justice, including information about the actual people who
do render justice in the truest sense of the word. Access to such information
not only serves the cause of justice generally by providing an independent,
non-governmental verification of the utter impartiality of the processes in-
volved in selecting jurors and shielding them from improper influences, it also
serves to enhance the operation of the jury system itself by educating the pub-
lic as to their own duties and obligations should they be called for jury
service.6 8
The court, therefore, held that the public had a first amendment
right of access to the names and addresses of jurors within a reason-
able time after the verdict was delivered. 69 The court then balanced
the first amendment right of access against the interests favoring clo-
sure, in this case the defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair
trial, and the privacy concerns expressed by the jurors themselves. 70
With regard to the defendant's sixth amendment rights, the court
recognized that the jurors' post-verdict discussion of the particular
deliberations of other jurors might ultimately inhibit the deliberative
process, but concluded that these concerns could be addressed only
by counseling, rather than by ordering, the jury not to discuss their
deliberations with anyone.7 1
64. Baltimore Sun, 841 F.2d at 75.
65. Id. at 76.
66. 675 F. Supp. 719 (D. Mass. 1987).
67. Id. at 722-23. As an initial matter, the court found it unnecessary for first
amendment purposes to determine "whether the post-verdict interviews are consid-
ered part of the criminal trial .... Id. at 722. Quoting Justice Stevens' concurring
opinion in Press Enterprise I, the district court noted that "'the distinction between
trials and other official proceedings is not necessarily dispositive, or even important, in
evaluating the First Amendment issues.'" Id. at 722 (quoting Press-Enterprise I, 464
U.S. 501, 516 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 723.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 723-24. The jurors in the Doherty case were unanimous in their objec-
tion to the court's revealing their identities to the media. Id. at 724.
71. Id. The court's charge to the jury seems at odds with its earlier statement ex-
tolling the virtues of post-verdict interviews. Apparently, the court thought it proper
for the press to inquire into the jurors' backgrounds, perceptions of the process, and
individual deliberations, but not into the particular deliberations of any of the jurors'
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As for the jurors' privacy concerns, the court determined that
these concerns could be accommodated by withholding the names
and addresses of the jurors until seven days after the verdict was de-
livered.72 The court reasoned that this delay would give the former
jurors sufficient time, after seventeen weeks of jury service,73 to re-
adjust to their normal lives and to reflect on their jury experience
prior to inquiries from the media.74 At the same time, the court con-
cluded that a one-week delay would not seriously impede the media's
ability to question the jurors as to their impartiality, the effect of
their backgrounds on the verdict, or the effects of a seventeen-week
trial on the jurors.75
Similarly, in In re New York Times Co.,76 the judge presiding over
the trial of John Hinckley, Jr., released the names and addresses of
the jurors at the commencement of jury deliberations. The court
held that first amendment interests had not been overcome by any
"overriding interest," and that publicity about the trial would "play a
large role in shaping public and legislative attitudes toward- the in-
sanity defense in the future."7 7
colleagues. Assuming that this is what the court sought to prevent, it simply could
have counseled the jurors not to reveal their colleagues' deliberations without counsel-
ing them in a manner which appeared to contradict recognition of the first amendment
right in the first place.
72. Id. at 725.
73. Id. at 720. The trial commenced on January 12, 1987, and the verdict was an-
nounced on May 7, 1987.
74. Id. at 725.
75. Id.
76. Misc. No. 82-0124 (D.D.C. June 19, 1982).
77. Id. The court's prediction proved correct. In 1984, shortly after Hinckley's ac-
quittal of the attempted assassination of the President of the United States, and
largely in response to public outrage about the verdict, Congress passed legislation
sharply reducing the availability of the insanity defense in federal criminal trials. See
Insanity Defense Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2057 (1984). There surely
would have been public outcry even without juror interviews. However, the candid
disclosures by the jury confirmed that, given the law as instructed to them by the trial
judge, they had no choice but to acquit Hinckley. This acquittal clearly intensified the
call for legislative reform. See generally W. WINSDALE & J. Ross, THE INSANITY PLEA
(1983).
In a related line of cases, several courts have held that it is an improper prior re-
straint in violation of the first amendment for a trial court to order the media not to
print information about jurors that it already has obtained, see, e.g., Capital Cities Me-
dia, Inc. v. Toole, 463 U.S. 1303, 1306 (1983) (Brennan, J., opinion in chambers) (order
granting application for stay), aff'd, 466 U.S. 378 (1984) (per curiam); Des Moines Reg-
ister & Tribune Co. v. Osmundson, 248 N.W.2d 493, 501 (Iowa 1976); New Mexico Press
Ass'n v. Kaufman, 98 N.M. 261, 267, 648 P.2d 300, 306 (1982), or to forbid all contact
between jurors and the media, see, e.g., Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d
1233, 1236-37 (10th Cir. 1986). These cases address the separate first amendment ques-
Conversely, several lower courts, without engaging in any first
amendment analysis, have concluded that no right of access to the
names and addresses of jurors exists. In United States v. Edwards,78
the Fifth Circuit upheld the trial court's closure of proceedings in-
volving the mid-trial questioning of jurors, after finding that no pre-
sumption of openness attached to such proceedings. 79 In an attempt
to accommodate first amendment values, the court did uphold the re-
lease of transcripts of the proceedings after the jury had reached its
verdict.8 0 However, the Fifth Circuit refused to overturn the trial
court's decision to edit the jurors' names from the transcript, citing
the jurors' right to "privacy and to protection from harassment," and
averring that the transcripts as released were sufficient to "reveal
the substance and significance of the issues."81
The New York Court of Appeals in Newsday, Inc. v. Sise82 upheld
the appellate division's decision not to disclose the names and ad-
dresses of jurors who were unable to reach a verdict in a murder
trial.83 The court's holding turned mainly on its determination that
disclosure was prohibited by New York statute,8 4 and thus, the court
largely ignored the first amendment arguments. The court held that
the first amendment right of access applied only to judicial proceed-
tion of prior restraints, but lend support to the recognition of a post-verdict right to
interview jurors.
78. 823 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1109 (1988).
79. Id. at 117.
80. Id. at 118-19.
81. Id. at 120; see also United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978). In Gurney, a case preceding Richmond Newspapers and its
progeny, the Fifth Circuit upheld the trial court's refusal to publicly release the names
and addresses of jurors despite the fact that the jurors' names had been called out in
open court during the jury selection process. Id. at 1210 & n.12. The court held that it
was within the discretion of the trial court to withhold this information in order to
protect juror privacy, especially in a highly publicized case. Id. at 1210. In support of
its holding, the court cited the Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury
System on the "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391, 410-11 (1968).
82. 71 N.Y.2d 146, 518 N.E.2d 930, 524 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
2823 (1988). The author's law firm, Townley & Updike, represented Newsday, Inc. in
the case.
83. Id. at 151-52, 518 N.E.2d at 933, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 38-39. The New York Freedom
of Information Law (FOIL) requires disclosure of records maintained by an "agency"
unless such records are "specifically exempted from disclosure" by other New York or
federal statutes. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87(2)(a) (McKinney 1988). One such exemp-
tion is for information provided on the juror questionnaires used by the Commissioner
of Jurors to determine juror qualifications: "Such questionnaires and records shall be
considered confidential and shall not be disclosed except to the county jury board or as
permitted by the appellate division." N.Y. JUD. LAW § 509(a) (McKinney Supp. 1989).
While acknowledging that FOIL was enacted to "encourage public awareness and un-
derstanding of and participation in government and to discourage official secrecy," the
Sise court nevertheless held that the above exception "exempted all information con-
tained in the questionnaires regardless of its nature and the possible effect on privacy
or safety interests which disclosure might cause." Sise, 71 N.Y.2d at 150, 152, 518
N.E.2d at 932-33, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 37-39 (emphasis in original).
84. Sise, 71 N.Y.2d at 153, 518 N.E.2d at 933, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
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ings, and that since the plaintiff had not sought access to a judicial
proceeding or transcript of such a proceeding, no first amendment in-
terests were implicated.85
IV. THE CASE FOR A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE
NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF JURORS
Despite the failure of those courts which have rejected a first
amendment right of access to jurors' names and addresses to engage
in any form of first amendment analysis,8 6 it is clear both from the
broad objectives underlying recognition of the first amendment
right,8 7 as well as from its almost uniform application by the judici-
ary in deciding questions of access to criminal processes and related
materials,88 that such an analysis must be made. The remainder of
this article will apply first amendment analysis and will conclude
that the first amendment affords a qualified right of access to jurors'
names and addresses after the conclusion of their services.
A. Application of the Test to Determine Whether a Presumptive
First Amendment Right of Access Exists
Press-Enterprise II provides a two-part test to determine whether a
presumptive right of access exists.8 9 First, it must be determined
whether the proceeding or practice in question has been traditionally
accessible to the public.90 Second, the merits of public access must be
examined to determine whether such access would play a significant
role in enhancing the judicial process.91 If these two questions are
answered in the affirmative, then there is a presumptive right of ac-
cess which may be overcome only if "closure is essential to preserve
higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve" those superior
values.92
85. Id. at 153 n.4, 518 N.E.2d at 933 n.4, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 39 n.4. The court also re-
jected the argument that there is a common law right of access to the names and ad-
dresses of jurors, on the ground that such information was not contained in any public
judicial records. Id.; cf. supra note 11 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 78-75 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 12-77 and accompanying text.
89. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 10-13 (1986).
90. Id. at 10-11.
91. Id. at 11-13.
92. Id. at 13-14 (quoting Press-Enterprise , 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)).
1. The Historical Tradition of Access
An examination of historical tradition indicates that jurors' identi-
ties and places of residence traditionally have been known to the
public.93 In the early days of jury development, jurors were neigh-
bors of the litigant; in fact, jurors could be disqualified if they were
not from the same neighborhood. 94 This "vicinage" requirement pre-
sumed that jurors would be acquainted with thecharacter of the liti-
gants and the witnesses;95 and, thus, litigants, witnesses, and
observers knew who the jurors were.
In the United States, prior to the mass urban migration that began
in the late nineteenth century, both the names and addresses of ju-
rors were freely available to the public.9 6 Criminal trials were open
to the public, and in most American communities, residents knew all
the members of any given jury; indeed, this is still the case in many
rural communities.97 Thus, only recently in the history of the jury
system have jurors primarily become strangers to the litigants and to
the observing public. Nonetheless, jurors' names are still frequently
called out in open court during voir dire,98 and litigants almost al-
ways have access to jurors' names and addresses.99Moreover, interviewing jurors after a trial to determine what led
them to reach their verdict has become commonplace throughout the
United States.10 0 In most cases, jurors who agree to be interviewed
93. While the Supreme Court has never addressed the question of a first amend-
ment.right of access to jurors' names and addresses, it has suggested that at least juror
names have ordinarily been available absent overriding circumstances. See Press En-
terprise I, 464 U.S. at 512 (noting that "a [juror's] valid privacy right may rise to a level
that part of the transcript should be sealed, or the name of a juror withheld, to protect
the [juror] from embarrassment").
94. See Pope, supra note 1, at 437-39. Jurors were required, moreover, to possess
information about the dispute at issue. "Ignorance of the facts was grounds for excuse
from jury service." Id. at 438.
95. 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 107 (1904), quoted
in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 568-69 (1980) (Burger, C.J.,
plurality).
96. See In re Baltimore Sun Co., 841 F.2d 74, 75 (4th Cir. 1988).
97. Id.
98. E.g., United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1210 n.12 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978).
99. E.g., United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719, 720 (D. Mass. 1987); see also
Note, Anonymous Juries, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 981, 988 (1986).
100. Arce & Henneberger, "Jurors Say the [Gotti] Case Left Much Room For
Doubt," N.Y. Newsday, Feb. 10, 1990, at 5 (quoting various jurors on their opinion of
the witnesses); Who's Who on the North Jury, N.Y. Newsday, Feb. 22, 1989, at 6 (graph
listing jurors in the trial of Oliver North, their occupations and knowledge of charge);
see, e.g., Hayes, A Jury Wrestles With Pornography, AM. LAW., Mar. 1988, at 96 (dis-
charged jurors discuss first federal obscenity conviction under RICO); Uhlig, Jurors
Describe "Wild" Shifts of Opinion, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1988, § 1, at 36, col. 1 (jurors
discuss nine days of deliberation preceding plea bargain in a publicized local murder
trial); Morgan, Howard Beach Juror Cites Victim's Fear, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1987, § 1,
at 38, col. 4 (jurors discuss reason behind manslaughter verdict in Howard Beach racial
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freely allow their names to be used in the resulting news report.1 0 '
Both historical tradition and current practice clearly indicate that the
identity and place of residence of jurors have been freely available in
the United States.
2. The Contributions of Post-Verdict Access to Jurors to the
Improvement of the Judicial Process
Turning to the second prong of the Press-Enterprise II test, it is
quite clear that information obtained from post-verdict interviews
with jurors plays a significant role in the functioning and enhance-
ment of the judicial process and of the government as a whole.
Juror interviews shed light on perhaps the most critical phase of
the criminal trial, and are essential if the public is to gain full appre-
ciation of the criminal process.102 Interviews with discharged jurors
also serve an educational function by familiarizing the public with a
proceeding in which most individuals will one day be required to take
part. 03
Furthermore, post-verdict interviews serve to assure the public
that, through our judicial system, justice can be and indeed has been
rendered. Results alone, as the Supreme Court has recognized, do
not satisfy "the natural community desire for 'satisfaction.' 1104 To
inspire public confidence, justice must satisfy the appearance of jus-
tice, and the appearance of justice is not served if those charged with
a crime may be regularly tried by juries whose members may remain
anonymous.10 5
attack trial); Hicks, Man, Given Death for Rape, Murder, Praises Prosecutor, L.A.
Times, Aug. 25, 1987, Metro, at 1, col. 5 (Orange County ed.) (jurors discuss breakdown
of deliberations); 8 Who Protested South Africa are Acquitted, N.Y. Times, May 18,
1985, § 1, at 33, col. 1 [hereinafter 8 Who Protested] (juror discusses acquittal of defend-
ants who occupied South African Consulate); Feron, Jurors in Harris Trial Re-Enacted
Night Of Murder Deliberations, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1981, § A, at 1, col. 5 (jurors dis-
cuss what led to verdict in Jean Harris murder trial).
101. See, e.g., Uhlig, supra note 100; Morgan, supra note 100; Jurors Discuss Protes-
ters: 'They Did It for a Reason', Daily Hampshire Gazette, Apr. 16, 1987, at 1 [hereinaf-
ter Jurors Discuss Protesters]; Coercion Fears Linked to Mistrial in Spy Case, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 8, 1985, § A, at 20, col. 5. But see Lindsey, Jurors Cite Entrapment and
Failure to Prove Case, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1984, § A, at 1, col. 3 (jurors who agreed to
discuss their verdict in DeLorean case refused to identify themselves by name).
102. See Doherty, 675 F. Supp. at 723.
103. See id.
104. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980) (Burger, C.J.,
plurality).
105: In re Baltimore Sun Co., 841 F.2d 74, 76 (4th Cir. 1988). Some commentators
argue that, rather than inspiring confidence in the judicial system, post-verdict inter-
views with jurors may actually serve to undermine public acceptance of jury verdicts.
The information obtained through access to jurors' names and ad-
dresses improves the quality of each particular criminal proceeding
and of the underlying process as a whole. Although the motivation
behind media contact with discharged jurors-unlike party or attor-
ney contact with jurors-is not to ferret out information with which
to attack the verdict,10 6 jury impropriety is, on occasion, uncovered
through media interviews with jurors.10 7 Moreover, research aided
by juror interviews has shed light on certain system-wide problems
adversely affecting the proper functioning of our judicial system,
which then may be the subject of judicial or legislative correction.108
Finally, although the modern day jury's role is officially limited to
See, e.g., Note, Public Disclosures of Jury Deliberations, 96 HARV. L. REV. 886, 891
(1983) [hereinafter Public Disclosures]. The apparent justness of jury verdicts in the
eyes of the public will not be maintained unless the factual and legal premises which
motivated a particular juror's deliberations remain shielded to prevent "easy and obvi-
ous criticism" of the verdict. Id. at 891 (quoting Nessen, Reasonable Doubt and Per-
missive Irferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1197 n.25 (1979)).
However, the argument itself-that a juror's deliberations must not be disclosed lest it
be revealed that the jury was proceeding upon a faulty legal premise or was subject to
outside influence-does more to undermine public confidence in jury verdicts than
does the information which discharged jurors regularly provide to the press. It is, af-
ter all, the verdict itself which serves as the primary focus of the public's attention and
emotions. When substantial segments of the public disagree with the verdict rendered
by a jury, judicial prohibitions on the jurors' discussion of the factors influencing their
decision will do more to cause those segments to reject the judicial system entirely
than would discretionary interaction between individual jurors and members of the
media, even if doubt is thereby cast on the validity of the individual verdict rendered.
106. See Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1986).
Attorneys' post-verdict requests for juror interviews, when the obvious motivation is
the search for evidence of improprieties in the deliberations, are strongly discouraged
and regularly denied. In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 810 (5th Cir. 1982).
107. See, e.g., United States v. Posner, 644 F. Supp. 885, 886 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 1986)
(trial court first learned that jury may have been exposed to prejudicial outside influ-
ences through newspaper article in which juror was interviewed), aff'd without opin-
ion sub nom. United States v. Scharrer, 828 F.2d 773 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 1110 (1988). Even if media exposure of improper jury conduct through juror in-
terviews in a particular case is not of the type which may result in invalidation of the
verdict, see Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987), exposing such misconduct may
result in reforms designed to minimize the possibility of such irregularities in the fu-
ture. Even if no reform occurs, it is in the public interest to alert the community of
the weaknesses, as well as the strengths, of the criminal jury trial system.
108. See, e.g., Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to
"The Central Meaning of the First Amendment", 83 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 612-13 (1983)
(juror interviews disclose that jurors do not understand how to apply New York Times'
reckless disregard standard); Mansfield, Jury Notice, 74 GEO. L.J. 395, 410 (1985) (cit-
ing study of juror interviews in support of conclusion that instructions to the jury are
ineffectual in dissuading jurors from using information acquired independent of the
evidence presented to reach their verdict); Note, The Frye Doctrine & Relevancy Ap-
proach Controversy: An Empirical Evaluation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1769, 1776-77 (1986) (citing
conflicting studies of juror interviews on question of whether jurors overestimate pro-
bative value of polygraph testimony); Brozan, Jurors in Rape Trials Studied, N.Y.
Times, June 17, 1985, § C, at 13, col. 2 (findings obtained from interviews with 360 ju-
rors who had served on juries in sexual assault prosecutions indicated that the victim's
allegations were doubted if she was sexually active or if she knew the assailant).
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serving as the trier of fact in a particular trial, it is well recognized
that the jury's actual role is not nearly so limited. Through its ver-
dict, the jury engages in subtle policy-making on issues as diverse as
the point beyond which the government may not step in inducing the
commission of a crime, 09 the limits of self-defense,110 the boundaries
of the defense of insanity,' and the permissibility of certain types of
protest against government policies.112
Moreover, through the process of juror nullification, the jury in a
criminal case has the power to ignore the law as instructed by the
judge and to disregard even uncontradicted evidence of guilt."i 3
Since before the birth of our nation, in cases as varied as the trial of
John Peter Zenger and prosecutions under the fugitive slave laws, ju-
ries have used this extraordinary power to acquit those charged with
an offense when they find the defendant's actions acceptable or con-
donable under the mores of the community."i 4
Thus, it is apparent that, far beyond simply deciding guilt or inno-
cence in a particular case, juries frequently exercise a quasi-legisla-
tive function in matters gravely affecting the direction of our society,
as well as in cases of lesser import. It is the post-verdict juror inter-
109. In the trial of John Z. DeLorean, for example, the defense successfully as-
serted that DeLorean would not have independently entered into a cocaine-distribu-
tion conspiracy if he had not been induced by the police. Interviews with jurors after
the verdict revealed that the jurors sought to send a message to the government that
its actions were inappropriate. See Lindsey, supra note 101; see also Whelan, Lead Us
Not Into (Unwarranted) Temptation: A Proposal to Replace the Entrapment Defense
With a Reasonable-Suspicion Requirement, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1193, 1199-1200 (1985).
110. Defendants charged with murdering a spouse or parent frequently raise the
defense of self-defense, asserting that their actions were justified in light of prolonged
exposure to physical or emotional abuse. Thus, jurors are asked to decide in these
cases whether and under what circumstances such conduct is justified. See, e.g.,
Timnick & Feldman, Son Acquitted of Trying to Murder Abusive Father, L.A. Times,
Oct. 11, 1986, Part 1, at 1, col. 1 (Home ed.).
111. In In re New York Times Co., Misc. No. 82-0124 (D.C. June. 19, 1982), the dis-
trict court found compelling the argument that it was essential that juror interviews
be conducted at the end of the Hinckley trial because "publicity about the case is likely
to play a large role in shaping public and legislative attitudes toward the insanity de-
fense in the future." Id.
112. In jury trials involving the occupation of foreign consulates, and the forcible
prevention of CIA recruitment on college campuses, defendants have successfully as-
serted that their otherwise illegal actions were necessary to prevent the occurrence of
greater harm. See Jurors Discuss Protesters, supra note 101; 8 Who Protested, supra
note 100.
113. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (defend-
ants charged with illegal entry and destruction of property at offices of the Dow
Chemical Company); United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 180-82 (1st Cir. 1969) (de-
fendants charged with conspiracy to interfere with the military draft).
114. See Levine, The Legislative Role of Juries, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 605-06.
view which allows the public to determine the message the jury is
sending through its verdict. In the absence of post-verdict interviews,
it is impossible to determine whether a jury's verdict resulted simply
from the government's inability to prove its case or whether other
factors were responsible, such as an acceptance of the defendant's be-
havior or a disapproval of the government's conduct. Post-verdict in-
terviews, therefore, play an essential role in the public debate of
issues critically germane to the criminal process and, indeed, to our
government as a whole.
In summary, the interests that led the Supreme Court to recognize
a right of access to criminal trials, to the voir dire of jurors, and to
preliminary hearings also are promoted by public access to the names
and addresses of jurors. Such access is consistent with and necessary
to the full enjoyment of the constitutional right of access to various
other components of the criminal process. Thus, the first amend-
ment grants a qualified right of access to the names and addresses of
jurors sitting in criminal trials after the conclusion of their jury
service.
V. BALANCING THE INTERESTS SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUROR
NAMES AND ADDRESSES AGAINST THOSE INTERESTS
FAVORING RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS
The Supreme Court consistently has recognized that, even when a
first amendment right of access is found to exist, the right of access is
not absolute and may be restricted to protect overriding interests.115
However, the Court requires that a strict standard be met before ac-
cess to information to which the first amendment attaches may be
denied. A restriction on access may be granted only if the restriction
is (1) necessitated by a compelling government interest, and (2) nar-
rowly tailored to serve that interest. 116
When courts and commentators opposing access attempt to deny
the existence of a first amendment right to particular information de-
spite the fact that access has been shown to advance the same inter-
ests which have led federal and state courts to recognize a right of
access in other judicial contexts, they essentially assert that any posi-
tive effects of access are overcome in every case by those interests
favoring closure.117 In Globe Newspaper, however, the Supreme
115. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. 501, 509 (1984) (noting that "[c]losed pro-
ceedings... must be rare and only for cause shown that outweighs the value of open-
ness"); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982) (to uphold
closure, "denial [of access must be] necessitated by a compelling governmental
interest").
116. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07.
117. See United States v. Edwards, 823 F.2d 111, 120 (5th Cir. 1987) (no error in re-
fusing to release jurors' names, as jurors are entitled to privacy and protection from
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Court stated that even the compelling state interest in protecting the
privacy and well-being of minor sexual assault victims was not suffi-
cient to override in every case the first amendment interests favoring
access, "for it is clear that the circumstances of the particular case
may affect the significance of the interest [favoring a restriction on
access]."11s Accordingly, the Court concluded that the first amend-
ment requires that the interests favoring access be balanced against
those interests supporting a restriction on access on a case-by-case ba-
sis, so that access will be denied only when absolutely necessary to
protect an overriding interest, and not upon the mere assertion of a
generalized interest. 1 9
Assuming a compelling interest in restricting access exists, a case-
by-case balancing of those interests supporting and opposing disclo-
sure is required unless the interests which oppose access are impli-
cated in every case and can never be served by any less restrictive
alternatives. In cases in which post-verdict access to the names and
addresses of jurors is sought, two competing interests generally are
asserted in opposition to access: (1) the jurors' right to privacy and
freedom from media harassment after the conclusion of their service;
and (2) the concern that freedom of debate and independence of
thought central to impartial jury deliberations will be stifled if jurors
know that their individual arguments and ballots might be disclosed
by fellow jurors contacted by the media. 120 Each of these interests
will be briefly analyzed to determine whether they justify a blanket
restriction on access to jurors' names and addresses.
A. Jurors' Right to Privacy
One argument presented in support of restrictions on the media's
ability to interview jurors after completion of their jury service is
that jurors should be "entitled to privacy and to protection [from]
harassment."121 Opponents of access argue that granting a qualified
harassment); United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, i210 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 968 (1978) (trial judge violated no first amendment right of access in refusing
to release names and addresses of jurors because both defendant's sixth amendment
right to fair trial and jurors' right to privacy must be respected). See generally Public
Disclosures, supra note 105.
118. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607-08.
119. Id. at 607-09.
120. Note, The First Amendment and Post-Verdict Interviews, 20 COLUM. J.L. LAW
& SOC. PROBS. 203, 231-33 (1986) [hereinafter First Amendment]; Public Disclosures,
supra note 105, at 888-92.
121. United States v. Harrelson, 713 F.2d 1114, 1116 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub
nom. El Paso Times, Inc. v. District Court for W. Dist., 465 U.S. 1041 (1984).
right of access to jurors' names and addresses will result in dis-
charged jurors being inundated by repeated media requests for inter-
views, lead to a complete disruption of their lives, and permanently
prejudice them against the prospect of future jury service.
Courts which have decided whether an individual has an absolute
protectable privacy interest against the public disclosure of his name
and address have uniformly held that such an interest does not ordi-
narily exist.122 Moreover, some courts have recognized that not all
jurors consider post-trial interviews a burden; indeed, some rather
enjoy the interviews. 123 To the extent the potential for harassment
may exist,124 this danger may be alleviated through the imposition of
safeguards, such as a prohibition against repeated requests for inter-
views once a juror has refused, or a commitment from the media that
122. See United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719, 725-26 (D. Mass. 1987)
(although recognizing that jurors have a right to privacy even after trial and that ju-
rors unanimously objected to having their names and addresses revealed, the court re-
leased names and addresses seven days after verdict); Pantos v. City of San Francisco,
151 Cal. App. 3d 258, 262, 198 Cal. Rptr. 489, 492 (1984) (no compelling interest in pri-
vacy presented to justify restricting access to list of qualified jurors); Lehman v. City
of San Francisco, 80 Cal. App. 3d 309, 313-14, 145 Cal. Rptr. 493, 495 (1978) (release of
prospective juror's name to litigants does not violate juror's right of privacy under
state or federal constitution); see also NLRB v. British Auto Parts, Inc., 266 F. Supp.
368, 373 (C.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd 405 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1968) (privacy rights of employ-
ees not violated by NLRB rule requiring employer to file a list of names and addresses
of all employees eligible to vote in labor representation election); In re Request of Ros-
ier, 105 Wash. 2d 606, 612-13, 717 P.2d 1353, 1358 (1986) (disclosure by public utility of
privacy interests). See generally Annotation, Publication of Address as Well as Name
of Person as Invasion of Privacy, 84 A.L.R. 3D 1159 (1978).
The Restatement (Second) of Torts specifies four ways in which privacy may be in-
vaded: (1) an intrusion upon a person's seclusion; (2) appropriation of a person's name
or likeness; (3) publication about a person's private life; or (4) publication which places
a person in a false light. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 625A-I, (Tent. Draft No.
22, 1976). Categories (2) and (4) are irrelevant to the question of disclosure of an indi-
vidual's name and address. Although categories (1) and (3) seem relevant, each re-
quires that the intrusion or publication be "highly offensive" to a reasonable man, a
standard which is not met when the act complained of is the mere disclosure of an in-
dividual's name and address, information readily available in the telephone directory
as well as in a myriad of public records.
123. United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 665 (2d Cir. 1978).
124. The media generally has not persisted in attempting to interview a juror once
that juror has indicated that he or she does not wish to be interviewed. United States
v. Coonan, 664 F. Supp. 861, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (indicating that media respected the
wishes of jurors in New York City corruption trial who indicated that they did not
want to be interviewed). In the overwhelming majority of criminal cases, there is sim-
ply no basis for believing that names and addresses are released to the media. See In
re Baltimore Sun, 841 F.2d 74, 76 n.5 (4th Cir. 1988) (court noted that no violence or
jury corruption was involved); Coonan, 664 F. Supp. at 863 (noting that "there is a cate-
gory of persons who, although prone to the most outlandish conduct, seem to draw the
line at interfering with those who are engaged in the administration of the judicial
process"). Should a credible threat of violence or harassment indeed exist, a court
could then deny access to the jurors' names and addresses based on its finding that clo-
sure is necessitated by the specific facts of the case.
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addresses of jurors will not be published.125
Thus, even if the privacy interests arising from the disclosure of ju-
rors' names and addresses are compelling, they still do not justify a
blanket rejection of any first amendment right since those interests
do not apply to every juror, nor are they implicated in every type of
criminal case. Alternatives to denial of access can adequately protect
the jurors' interest in privacy without eviscerating the public's first
amendment right.
B. The Threat That Post-Verdict Juror Interviews Will Stifle the
Freedom of Debate Essential to a Fair and Impartial Jury
Deliberation
Courts and commentators opposing post-verdict juror interviews
also argue that the ability of the jury to engage in fair and uninhib-
ited deliberations would be threatened if jurors knew that "their ar-
guments and ballots were [to be] freely published to the world."126
However, proponents of this argument offer no empirical evidence to
support the theory that the prospect of post-verdict juror interviews
retroactively influences individual juror's deliberations.12 7 Given the
extent to which such interviews are conducted following criminal tri-
als, sufficient opportunity has clearly been presented to garner such
evidence if it in fact exists.1 28 Moreover, the American experience
with post-verdict juror interviews by the media indicates that judicial
admonitions to departing jurors not to discuss the specific votes or
positions taken by other jurors129 have been largely successful in
preventing such exposure.130 Thus, the argument that post-verdict
125. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. at 726. Members of the media who ignore the judicial
imposition of such safeguards may be punished by the court.
126. First Amendment, supra note 120, at 232.
127. In Globe Newspaper, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that denying
access to the testimony of minor sexual assault victims would improve the quality of
their testimony because of the absence of any empirical support for this proposition.
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 609 n.26 (1982).
128. This is not the type of situation criticized by Chief Justice Burger in his dis-
sent chastising the Globe Newspaper majority for pointing to an absence of empirical
support for the government's argument favoring closure since no opportunity to com-
pile such data had occurred. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 617 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
129. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 Mass. 192, 201-02 n.9, 385 N.E.2d 513, 519
n.9 (1979) (instruction to jurors discouraging them from revealing fellow jurors' names
or how they arrived at verdict).
130. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 100 (Howard Beach jurors who agreed to be inter-
viewed refused to disclose how many jurors had been adamant against murder
convictions).
interviews adversely affect the deliberative process simply lacks
foundation, both in theory and in fact.
VI. CONCLUSION
The factors leading the Supreme Court and lower federal and state
courts to recognize a right of access to various aspects of the criminal
proceeding are equally served by recognition of a right of access to
jurors' names and addresses at some point after the conclusion of
their jury service. While interests favoring a denial of access to such
information may, in a given case, rise to the level at which the first
amendment right is overcome, no interest favoring denial is suffi-
ciently compelling to overcome the constitutional right of access in
every case. Thus, the qualified first amendment right of access to ju-
rors' names and addresses must be a factor which is balanced in any
judicial determination concerning the question of access.
